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Top Tens in 2013:
Patent, Trademark, Copyright and Trade Secret Cases
Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property, Spring 2014
Stephen McJohn*

In 2013, the Supreme Court continued its recent concentration on patent law. The Court
decided four patent cases, holding that isolated human DNA is not patentable; that lawsuits
alleging legal malpractice in patent cases are to be litigated in state, not federal, court; that seeds
grown from genetically modified patented seeds cannot be resold; and that reverse-payment
settlements between brand name and generic pharmaceutical companies are subject to scrutiny
under the anti-trust laws. The one trademark case the Court decided addressed an issue with
more impact in the patent area: whether a rights holder can destroy jurisdiction in a declaratory
judgment case, by promising not to sue. Meanwhile, a lower court imported into trademark law a
principle from patent law, that fraud in the prosecution of a trademark may support an anti-trust
action.
First sale, or exhaustion, proved to be a pressure point. In all areas, courts looked at how
much control a rights holder has on authorized products released to the market. The Supreme
Court held that copyright is not infringed, where books printed overseas with the permission of
the copyright holder (intended for foreign markets) are imported to the US. Other copyright
*
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cases addressed whether first sale authorized resale of digital works, whether a digital clipping
service violated copyright, and whether an artist’s adaptation of authorized photo prints
qualified for fair use. In patent law, the Court considered the application of exhaustion to works
in code. While holding that exhaustion did not authorize the sale of second-generation patented
seeds, the Court carefully limited its holding to leave room for later case development, rather
than making a broad holding with respect to such “self-replicating” products like biotech and
software.
The holders of copyrights, patents and trademarks often seek to use secondary liability to
find defendants with deeper pockets and to cut off the infringing activity at a critical point in the
supply chain. Although the rules on secondary liability are quite different in each area, the
general principles show increasing convergence. The owner of a swap-meet could avoid liability
for known infringement by its vendors only by instituting a bona-fide program to address
infringement, rather than token measures – a common law standard similar to copyright’s
statutory scheme for internet service providers, who must administer a bona fide program to
address notices of infringement. Analogously, in patent law, a party with good-faith belief in
non-infringement could not be liable for inducing patent infringement. Another critical point in
the supply chain is importation. The Supreme Court held that, in effect, a copyright holder does
not have the right to create separate foreign and domestic markets. In patent law, the Federal
Circuit held that International Trade Commission procedures may be not be used to exclude
infringing products, where no real domestic production or patent licensing program exists to
protect, as opposed to simply putting leverage for settlement of a dispute.
Courts continue to seek the borders of protectable matter in each area, but the border
issues are quite different. The DNA case marks the third recent Supreme Court case seeking to
differentiate patentable subject matter from the nonpatentable domains: abstract ideas, natural
physical phenomena and laws of nature. Despite the Court’s broad guidance, the lower courts
have continued to find no clear boundary to patent subject matter. Copyright cases looked to
whether terraforming in a virtual world created a fixed copyrightable work and whether diagrams
describing theories showed noncopyrightable ideas or copyrightable expression. But these
frontier issues have perhaps less impact that than the continuing issue of the extent of fair use.
Trademark cases sought the line between protectable trademark and patentable functional matter
matter. In trade secret law, an increasing split appears with respect to how much protection
information in computer systems receives, especially where the information is protected less by
security measures than by contracts, such as employment contracts or web site terms of use.

2

Electroniccopy
copy available
available at:
Electronic
at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2366496
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2366496

Patent

Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 1

Myriad addressed an issue with considerable practical importance for biotechnology, but
also one of philosophical interest, “Are human genes patentable?” Myriad is the third Supreme
Court decision on patentable subject matter, after decades where the Court did not address the
issue. The 1980 decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty 2 had held that a genetically engineered
microorganism was patentable. Chakrabarty emphasized that not everything is patentable,
repeating three judicially-created exceptions: “the laws of nature, physical phenomena, and
abstract ideas.” 3 The Court also decided three difficult-to-reconcile computer-invention cases
around that time, Gottschalk v. Benson, 4 Parker v. Flook, 5 and Diamond v. Diehr 6. Over the
following decades, the Federal Circuit struggled to define the boundaries of those exceptions,
formulating a number of tests, including the machine-or-transformation test, the useful-concretetangible test, the rule against patenting “mental steps,” and the applied-algorithm test. 7
The Supreme Court returned to the issue in 2010, holding in Bilski v. Kappos 8 that the
Federal Circuit’s “machine-or-transformation” test should not determine patent subject matter.
Bilski held that a broadly claimed method of hedging was an abstract idea and so not patentable.
The Court next addressed the exception for laws of nature, in Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 9 holding a diagnostic method was not patentable. The claimed
method, which consisted of measuring metabolite levels in the patient’s blood and adjusting
medication accordingly, simply identified a law of nature (the relationship between metabolite
levels and the effect of medication) and then followed “well-understood, routine, conventional
activity previously engaged in by scientists who work in the field.” 10
Myriad addressed the remaining exception to patentable subject matter, physical
phenomena. The exception clearly bars a patent on a human gene as that gene appears in the
1

133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980).
3
Id., 447 U.S. at 309, citing Benson, Flook and Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S.
127, 130 (1948);O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62, 112-121 (1854); Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 175 (1853).
4
409 U.S. 63 (1972).
5
437 U.S. 584 (1978).
6
450 U.S. 175 (1981).
7
See Stephen McJohn, Top Tens in 2010: Patent and Trademark Cases, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
313, 314 (2011).
8
129 S. Ct. 2735 (2010).
9
132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
10
_ U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1297-98, 182 L.Ed.2d 321 (2012).
2
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body. Myriad provides some guidance on how different a chemical must be from the natural
form to be patentable. The Court held that a patent was not available for isolated DNA, “specific
segments of DNA — for instance, a particular gene or part of a gene — which can then be
further studied, manipulated, or used.” 11 DNA identical to that in the body is not patentable,
although its shape will be different and it will no longer be entangled with other materials. But
patent protection could be obtained for complementary DNA, a synthetic molecule which
consisted only of the DNA which matched the sequence in humans that codes for genes. In
effect, Myriad’s patents were not valid where they simply claimed DNA sequences matching
those in the body (a product of nature), but were valid where they claimed portions of DNA
sequences (a “molecule that is not naturally occurring”) created by discarding DNA that did not
code for amino acids. 12
The practical effect of Myriad may not be great. Many gene patents are expiring anyway.
Myriad’s DNA patents, for example, would have expired in 2015. Isolated DNA claims are
evidently invalid, but claims on complementary DNA, along with method claims, still give
plenty of enforcement power. Indeed, Myriad has actively enforced its other claims after the
decision. More broadly, it remains to be seen how Myriad applies to other inventions closely
related to scientific discoveries, such as molecules crafted to have the same property as newlydiscovered natural molecules. Myriad does clarify that the three exceptions - “the laws of nature,
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas – are not independent; rather, the reasoning behind each
will affect cases in the other categories. Myriad also takes a broad, practical approach to
patentability, without seeking to draw predictable bright line rules.

Gunn v. Minton 13
Courts often have to draw the line between federal law and state law in intellectual
property cases. The question may be substantive, involving such questions as whether federal
patent law preempts state trade secret law, or whether federal copyright law preempts such state
law such as misappropriation or rights of publicity. Gunn dealt with the jurisdictional issue of
whether federal or state courts should hear malpractice claims in patent cases. The Federal
Circuit had generally held that such cases were subject to federal jurisdiction, where they
depended on interpreting patent law. But the Supreme Court in Gunn cut drastically back on
federal jurisdiction for state law malpractice claims involving patents. The Court reasoned that a
malpractice claim based on alleged faulty patent prosecution involved not a real question of
patent law, but rather questions of fact involving hypothetical patents. 14 For federal jurisdiction,
the patent issue must be “substantial.” Although the issue was substantial as between the parties,
11
12
13
14

133 S. Ct. at 2112.
133 S. Ct. at 2119.
133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013).
133 S. Ct. at 1067.
4
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it was not substantial in terms of its impact on federal patent law: “Because of the backwardlooking nature of a legal malpractice claim, the question is posed in a merely hypothetical sense:
If Minton’s lawyers had raised a timely experimental-use argument, would the result in the
patent infringement proceeding have been different? No matter how the state courts resolve that
hypothetical ‘case with a case,’ it will not change the real-world result of the prior federal patent
litigation. Minton’s patent will remain invalid.” 15 The Court further reasoned that allowing state
courts to address such hypothetical questions would not interfere with federal court power to
decide patent issues, because the state court’s interpretation would not be binding authority on
federal courts.
Minton’s specific holding will affect only patent malpractice cases. But more broadly, it
indicates that the Supreme Court is less concerned than the Federal Circuit about that “patent
appeals court” having an iron grip on patent law, subject only to the Supreme Court’s
supervisory role. That could play into such issues as when the Federal Circuit is obliged to
follow precedent from other circuits and whether the Federal Circuit must give deference to
lower courts when hearing appeals on such matters as grants of attorney’s fees or patent claim
construction.

Bowman v. Monsanto Co. 16
Monsanto’s patented Ready Roundup seeds have “a genetic modification that enables
soybean plants to survive exposure to glyphosate, the active ingredient in many herbicides.” 17
When Monsanto sells those seeds to farmers, it cannot sue them for using the seeds. That
unsurprising result flows from the doctrine of patent exhaustion: where the patent holder
authorizes the sale of a product embodying the invention, the patent holder implicitly allows the
owner to use the product. The “initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent
rights to that item.” 18 Otherwise, every buyer would have to get an explicit license, which would
unnecessarily complicate sales – or defeat their purpose.
The issue in Bowman was whether patent exhaustion applies, where the authorized seeds
grow into corn, and produce seeds of their own. The Supreme Court held that the secondgeneration seeds were “additional copies,” not subject to the patent exhaustion doctrine. The
seeds could be used as feed (which Monsanto permitted) but not grown to make more plants,
which in turn would make more seeds. Otherwise, farmers would “need only buy the seed once,
whether from Monsanto, a competitor, or (as here) a grain elevator. The grower could multiply

15

133 S. Ct. at 1066-1067.
133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013).
17
Id. at 1764.
18
Id. at 1766, quoting Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U. S. 617, 625, 128 S. Ct. 2109,
170 L. Ed. 2d 996 (2008).
16
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his initial purchase, and then multiply that new creation, ad infinitum—each time profiting from
the patented seed without compensating its inventor.” 19
Biotechnology and computer science both involve self-replicating technology. How those
technologies will develop is hard to predict. The Bowman court was careful not to create a straitjacket for the future of patent law: “Our holding today is limited—addressing the situation before
us, rather than every one involving a self-replicating product. We recognize that such inventions
are becoming ever more prevalent, complex, and diverse. In another case, the article's selfreplication might occur outside the purchaser's control. Or it might be a necessary but incidental
step in using the item for another purpose.”

Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis Inc. 20
When a patent case settles, the alleged infringer is likely to pay an agreed sum to the
patent holder. In some pharmaceutical cases, the opposite happens. When a pharmaceutical
patent holder sues the maker of a generic version of the drug, the parties may settle with the
generic maker agreeing to stay out of the market for a period of time, in return for a payment
from the patent holder. That looks like a an anti-trust case, where competitors strike an
agreement that will drastically effect the market price, because generics generally sell for much
less than branded pharmaceuticals. But the Eleventh Circuit had held, in line with a number of
other courts, that such an agreement is “immune from antitrust attack so long as its
anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent.” 21 Such
courts reasoned that a patent is intended to give control over the relevant market to the patent
holder. Moreover, there is a strong policy in favor of encouraging settlement of disputes. Few
disputes are as complex and expensive as pharmaceutical patents lawsuits.
The Supreme Court took a different approach. A valid patent does give the right to
control the market for the patented product. But, the Court reasoned, patents are often shown to
be invalid in litigation. In addition, the patent does not prevent the sales of competing products
that are not covered by the patent claims. Making reverse-payment settlements immune from
anti-trust attack could allow holders of invalid patents to nevertheless control the market or
holders of valid patents to extend their control beyond the patent. The Court did not hold that
reverse-payment settlements were presumptively violations of anti-trust law, like price-fixing
agreements between competitors. Rather, it held that such agreements would be subject to antitrust scrutiny under the rule of reason. A party complaining of the agreement, such as the Federal
Trade Commission, would still have the burden of showing that its anti-competitive effects
outweighed its pro-competitive effects.
19
20
21

133 S. Ct. at 1767.
133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
Id. at 2227, quoting FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012).
6
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The case could have considerable impact beyond pharmaceutical patent litigation.
Potential competitors often enter into transactions involving patents, such as joint ventures,
cross-licensing, marketing and service agreements. Actavis makes it more likely that such
transactions could be attacked on anti-trust grounds.
CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty. 22
CLS Bank shows the recent Supreme Court cases may have provided guidance on the
scope of patent subject matter, but have left the boundaries uncertain. The entire Federal Circuit
sat en banc to hear the case, but did not reach a clear conclusion. The patents at issue cover “a
computerized trading platform used for conducting financial transactions,” which would reduce
settlement risk by “relying on a trusted third party to ensure the exchange of either both parties'
obligations or neither obligation.“ 23 A divided panel of the Federal Circuit had held that the
claimed invention was not an unpatentable abstract idea like the method of hedging risk in Bilski.
Rather it was patentable as “the practical application of a business concept in a specific way.” 24
The dissent viewed the asserted patent claims as “abstract ideas repackaged as methods and
systems.” 25 The judges voted to rehear the case en banc, but no specific view gathered a
decisive majority. Rather, the court simply issued a four-line, per curiam opinion affirming the
holding of the district court that the claims were not directed to patentable subject matter. There
followed lengthy concurring and dissenting opinions that set forth non-binding views of various
groups of circuit judges. CLS Bank shows how elusive the boundaries of patentable subject
matter remain.
Soverain Software LLC v. Newegg Inc.; 26 Ceats, Inc. v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc. 27
Soverain Software has collected considerable revenue by licensing a patent that covered
on-line shopping carts. 28 The Federal Circuit invalidated the patent, on the grounds that the
invention was obvious. The claimed invention, with broad application in electronic commerce,
was held to be obvious in the light of similar system, the CompuServe Mall, which operated on a
pre-Internet network. The networks and software may be different, but the court agreed with
Newegg that “a person of ordinary skill could have adapted the CompuServe order command to
known browser capabilities when these capabilities became commonplace, and that it was
obvious to do so.” 29 After Soverain Software, patents which simply involves translating
22

717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc). On December 6, the Supreme Court granted cert. to hear the
case.
23
Id. at 1274.
24
CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 685 F.3d 1341, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
25
Id. at 1356.
26
705 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2013) .
27
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 8483 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 26, 2013).
28
Joe Mullin, How Newegg crushed the “shopping cart” patent and saved online retail, arstechnica.com
(Jan 27 2013).
29
705 F.3d at 1340.
7
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activities to the Internet environment from other environments (whether computer networks or
the “real world”) are very likely obvious. Genuine inventive activity must be required in
adapting or reconceptualizing practices in order to qualify for patent protection.
The court’s discussion of secondary considerations is also noteworthy. Commercial
success may be a factor supporting a determination of nonobviousness. If a product or method is
widely sold or licensed, that can indicate that it was not obvious. Soverain argued that its
patented software had been sold and licensed to a good number of customers. But the court noted
that the software itself was not used or was quickly abandoned by those who purchased it.
Rather, “licenses were taken to avoid the costs of litigation.” 30 Such success in obtaining licenses
weighed little. That holding has considerable import for future cases involving patent assertion
entities (also known by such terms as “patent trolls” or “non-practicising licensors,” depending
on one’s point of view). Success in getting licenses may not be weighed as evidence that the
asserted patent is a valid one.
Ceats held that a software patent on a method of assigning airline seats was invalid,
because the invention was not new in light of references including technical specifications, a
checklist and user video. Akin to Soverain Software, Ceats shows that simply doing something
in software for the first time should not support a patent. It likewise has broad implications for
software patents, because software often involves taking existing processes and making them
more efficient.

Cooper Notification, Inc. v. Twitter, Inc.; 31 Function Media, L.L.C. v. Google Inc. 32

30
31
32

705 F.3d at 1346.
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 18120 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
708 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2013). On the subject of claim interpretation, two cases illustrate that the patent
holder is stuck with the claims she drafted. In Alexsam, Inc. v. IDT Corp., 715 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013), the
patent holder was required to prove a negative, where the patent claimed a payment system that, among other
elements, included point-of-sale devices had not been modified. In Piggy Pushers, LLC v. Skidders Footwear,
Inc., 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 22686 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 8, 2013), a patent that claimed a child’s sock was not
infringed by a very similar device that was a shoe. Such cases do have the virtue of limiting patents to their
claims, but may encourage circuitous drafting.
8
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33

Cooper Notification and Function Media reflect the important role of claim interpretation
plays in determining the scope of software patent protection. Cooper Notification held a patent
application, filed in 2004, on “a system of mass messaging in which a message is sent to one or
more communication gateways that forward that message to individual users.” That could also
describe Twitter.
But patent rights depend not on the general description of the invention, but rather what
the applicant specifically claims. The relevant claim is much more specific:
12. A communication system comprising:
a first messaging subsystem which may be coupled to an alert originator and to one or
more communication gateways, wherein each of the gateways is also coupled to at least
one user terminal, and wherein the first messaging subsystem associates a unique set of
message parameters with each of the communication gateways;
wherein the first messaging subsystem is configured to transmit at least one gateway
message to a plurality of the user terminals via the one or more communication gateways,
in accordance with each set of the unique message parameters for each communication
gateway, upon receiving a first message from the alert originator;
wherein the first messaging subsystem is configured to reformat, for each of the one or
more gateway messages, the first message received from the alert originator to a format
in which the communication gateway associated with the gateway message will accept
and perform operations in response to the incoming gateway message; and

33

U.S. Pat. No. 7409428 B1.
9
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wherein the first messaging subsystem is configured to form an address for each of the
one or more gateway messages to include the domain name information associated with
the communication gateway or the user identification information associated with the
registered user receiving the second message.

Twitter’s service did not fall within that patent claim, because Twitter does not send the same
gateway message to all users, rather sends it to a location from which separate messages are sent
out. The same result, but implemented differently.

10

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2366496

Function Media likewise declined to read software patent claims broadly enough to cover
later-developed technology. Search engine advertising did not infringe a software patent that
relied on terms such as “seller,” “buyer,” “publisher,” and “media venue.” Those terms would
not be read in an unnaturally broad way to make them applicable to displays on search pages of
internet users.
Motiva, LLC v. ITC 34

A patent holder may use federal lawsuits against infringers. A more effective approach
sometimes is to use a proceeding before the International Trade Commission to exclude
infringing imports. This gets the articles before they reach the domestic market and avoids the
substantive and procedural problems of suing foreign entities. Importers may be easier to identify
than domestic infringers. A patent licensor may be able to exclude imports even if it could not
get an injunction in court because reasonable royalty damages may be sufficient to show lack of
irreparable harm. 35 An ITC proceeding, however, may only be used if "an industry in the United
34

35

716 F.3d 596 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Another important case for international enforcement, which sometimes can
be best done using secondary liability, is Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d 1361(Fed. Cir. 2013),
which held that good faith believe in non-infringement negates the scienter requirement for active inducement.
eBay Inc v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Interdigital Communs., LLC v. ITC, 2013 U.S.
App. LEXIS 689 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 10, 2013). Patent holders have had considerable success before the ITC,
11
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States, relating to the articles protected by the patent . . . exists or is in the process of being
established." 36 This requirement of a domestic industry to protect can be met by showing
substantial investment in licensing of the patent. 37
Motiva held a patent on a "Human Movement Measurement System." Motiva sought an
ITC exclusion order to bar import of Nintendo video games. But the only investment in licensing
that Motiva could point to was a patent lawsuit that it had also brought against Nintendo in
federal court. “Motiva's litigation against Nintendo was not an investment in commercializing
Motiva's patented technology that would develop a licensing program to encourage adoption and
development of articles that incorporated Motiva's patented technology.” 38 Licensing may be
used as basis for ITC jurisdiction, but is not a general ground that any patent holder may use
simply to get before the ITC.
FRANDs and Frenemies: Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc. 39

Microsoft and Motorola were both parties to standard-setting organizations that created
industry standards for wireless communication technology. As part of joining, parties agreed to
license patents necessary to implement the standards. They agreed to offer such licenses on
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions ("RAND," sometimes known as
FRAND by adding “fair”). Motorola offered to license its patents to Microsoft for use with the
Xbox video game console and other products, but at a royalty rate higher than Microsoft was
willing to pay. The court looked at a number of factors in arriving at a royalty rate which was
considerably below that which had been offered by Motorola. That allowed the court to look at
the list of factors that courts look at in infringement actions in order to assess damages,
appropriately modified to adapt to the context of standard-setting patents:

1. The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit, proving or
tending to prove an established royalty.
2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the patent in
suit.
3. The nature and scope of the license.
4. The licensor's established policy and marketing program to maintain his patent
monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting licenses under
special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly.
5. The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as, whether they
are competitors in the same territory in the same line of business; or whether they are
inventor and promoter.

36
37
38
39

although that may be changing. See Michael G. McManus, Section 337 Caseload and Win Rate Revert to
Norms, Patently-O (October 23, 2013).
19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(2).
19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3).
716 F.3d at 601.
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013)
12
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6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other products of the
licensee; the existing value of the invention to the licensor as a generator of sales of his
non-patented items; and the extent of such derivative or convoyed sales.
7. The duration of the patent and the term of the license.
8. The established profitability of the product made under the patent; its commercial
success; and its current popularity.
9. The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or devices, if any,
that had been used for working out similar results.
10. The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial embodiment of
it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to those who have used the
invention.
11. The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and any evidence
probative of the value of that use.
12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the particular
business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the invention or analogous
inventions.
13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as
distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or
significant features or improvements added by the infringer.
14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts.
15. The amount that a licensor and a licensee would have agreed upon (at the time the
infringement began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an
agreement. 40
The case sets an important precedent for industry standard patents that are subject to
standard-setting agreements. Standard-setting organizations are common in a number of
industries. Patents held by members often apply to the technology. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola
shows that courts, although often reluctant to set the terms of transactions, will set prices where
necessary. The case also indicates the courts are likely to take the approach that once a patent
holder has encouraged reliance on its invention in setting an industry standard, it will no longer
have the ability to withhold permission until it receives agreement to the terms it sets, as is
generally the rule. Rather, the court, borrowing from a measure of damages for patent
infringement, sought to set royalty rates according to the terms that the parties would likely have
reached in a hypothetical negotiation.
Rates Technology Inc. v. Speakeasy Inc.
Rates Technology balances two policies with broad effect on patent litigation and
licensing practice. Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 41 a no-contest
clause in a patent license is generally not enforceable. To encourage parties to test the validity of
patents, neither an agreement not to challenge the patent or the doctrine of licensee estoppel
prevent an alleged infringer from arguing that the patent should not have been issued. Otherwise,
patent license agreements would routinely include no-contest clauses, barring challenges by
licensees, the parties often most likely to have reason to complain of dubious patents. If Lear
40
41

2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233 at 54-56.
395 U.S. 653, 89 S. Ct. 1902, 23 L. Ed. 2d 610 (1969).
13
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were taken to the extreme, however, it would be difficult to settle patent lawsuits. If no-contest
clauses in settlement agreements were not enforced, an accused infringer could settle, then
effectively renege by challenging the patent again. To facilitate settlement, courts have held Lear
inapplicable to litigation settlement agreements. 42
Rates Technology involved an intermediate case, settlement of a dispute that had not yet
resulted in a case filed in federal court. Although recognizing the importance of encouraging
settlement, the court held that pre-litigation agreements not to contest patent validity were not
enforceable. Without litigation, parties would not have the benefit of discovery to uncover
documentary evidence and witness testimony that could clarify whether the patent was likely
valid. Moreover, a contrary rule would encourage patent holders to characterize every license,
where possible, as a settlement agreement. Many license agreements follow a cease-and-desist
letter or other demand for payment, so characterizing licenses as settlements would be easily
accomplished.

42

Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362, 1367-70 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
14
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Trademark

Already L.L.C. d/b/a Yums v. Nike Inc. 43
Disputes about intellectual property rights often lead to lawsuits. Most often, the rights
holder sues for infringement, seeking damages or an injunction. In some cases, however, the
possible infringer will bring a declaratory judgment action, seeking clarification that it is not
infringing, such as a ruling that a patent is invalid. The Federal Circuit had held that patent
licensees in good standing could not bring declaratory actions against the relevant patent holder.
The court’s theory was that if the licensee was in good standing and so not subject to suit, there
was no controversy between the parties. The Supreme Court rejected that rule in MedImmune, 44
holding that a declaratory judgment action could be brought if there was an actual controversy,
such as a dispute about the validity of the patent. After MedImmune, patent holders had to be
more careful about asserting their rights. Before sending even a cease-and-desist letter, the patent
holder had to consider the risk that the recipient would take it to court.
Already addressed the issue, where a controversy exists, whether the rights holder can
destroy jurisdiction by committing not to sue for infringement. Nike had sued Already, alleging
infringement of its Air Force 1 trademark for shoes. Already filed a counterclaim, alleging that
the mark was invalid. Nike later filed in court a covenant not to sue, and sought dismissal of
both sets of claims.
“[Nike] unconditionally and irrevocably covenants to refrain from making any claim(s)
or demand(s) . . . against Already or any of its . . . related business entities . . . [including]
distributors . . . and employees of such entities and all customers . . . on account of
any possible cause of action based on or involving trademark infringement, unfair
competition, or dilution, under state or federal law . . . relating to the NIKE Mark based
on the appearance of any of Already’s current and/or previous footwear product designs,
and any colorable imitations thereof, regardless of whether that footwear is produced . . .
or otherwise used in commerce before or after the Effective Date of this Covenant.” 45
The Supreme Court held that “voluntary cessation” of enforcement destroy jurisdiction, provided
that it “could not reasonably be expected” to resume its enforcement efforts.” 46 Nike’s actions
met the test, because of the broad, irrevocable covenant not to sue, which covered not just

43
44
45
46
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Already but also Already’s distributors and customers. There could no longer be fear of a
trademark action, so there was no actual controversy for a court to resolve.
Already establishes that rights holder may avoid litigation, but only by expressly and
irrevocably abandoning the ability to sue. The case adds a new layer of strategy to intellectual
property enforcement.

Embarcadero Technologies Inc. v. RStudio Inc., 47 Kinbook, LLC v. Microsoft Corp. 48
“RStudio” and “ER/Studio” were trademarks used in the software industry. At first
glance, they seem confusingly similar, meaning that only the mark with priority would be valid.
But a little explication showed that people in the relevant markets should be readily able to
distinguish them. R is a computing language often used in connection with advanced statistics
applications. “ER” referred to “entity relationships.” The marks find quite different uses in
software, although they both deal with data. “Studio” is often used in software to refer to a
development tools. Software makers that want broader protection must seek more distinctive
marks.
Kinbook likewise held that superficially similar marks were not confusingly similar in the
marketplace context. ‘Kinect' for a hands-free video-game interface was held not to infringe
‘Kinbox' for social networking software. The first syllable, “Kin”, is similar. But its meaning is
subtly but distinctly different in the two marks, connoting general social connection in the first
and blood kinship in the second. The products might both be considered computer products, but
in very different fields.
Southern Snow Mfg. Co. v. SnoWizard Holdings, Inc. 49
Southern Snow held that fraud in the prosecution of a trademark claim, as with patent,
may be the basis of an anti-trust claim. The 1965 Supreme Court decision in Walker Process
Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 50 established that enforcement of a
fraudulently obtained patent could be the basis of an anti-trust action, as long as the other
elements were shown. The question in Southern Snow was whether the doctrine would extend to
trademarks.
Patents, like copyright, give a set of exclusive rights. Only the patent holder may sell the
patented invention. A patent does not necessarily establish a monopoly, because other goods may
be compete in the same market with the patented invention. But a patent can be a potent weapon
against actual and potential competitors. A trademark gives a much narrower right, the right to
prevent others from using confusingly similar symbols on competing goods. The Supreme Court,
however, has held that an anti-trust violation may rest on abuse of other types of administrative
47
48
49
50
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proceedings, such as opposition to granting a trucking firm an operating license. 51 Moreover,
dicta in earlier cases had stated that abuse of a trademark might be an anti-trust violation. The
Southern Snow court, although recognizing that only rarely would other necessary elements such
as market power be shown, held that a cause of action could lie.

Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega 52
For decades, Paddle Tramps sold paddles adorned with the insignia of college fraternities
and sororities. Those organizations sporadically sent letters, either ordering him to cease and
desist or inviting him to join in their licensing organization. Finally, they sued for infringement.
Abraham upheld the ruling that they were not entitled to damages. Laches may bar damages
where a plaintiff inexcusably delays bringing suit and a damages award would cause undue
prejudice to the defendant. The decades of inaction with knowledge of the alleged infringement,
while Paddle Tramps further invested in the business met that standard. But although plaintiffs
did not receive the remedy of damages, the court did uphold an injunction against further
infringement. The prejudice to Paddle Tramps was outweighed by the policy of avoiding further
consumer confusion as to endorsement of the paddles by the fraternities and sororities. In effect,
laches acted as a revocable license. The trademark holders’ delay allowed Paddle Tramps to use
the marks without payment, but by bringing action they terminated that implied permission.
Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Int'l, Inc. 53

51
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See California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (U.S. 1972).
708 F.3d 614 (5th Cir. 2013).
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 18897 (6th Cir. Ohio 2013).
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Product design is protected as a trademark only if it is not functional. Groenveld claimed
trade dress protection in the design of the base and reservoir of a grease pump. It alleged
Lubecore infringed by copying that design, rather than using an alternative. Groenveld argued
that the design was not functional, because many other designs could accomplish the same task.
Indeed, other competitors in the market used different configurations. Because the design was
not a competitive necessity, Groenveld argued, it was not functional.
The court rejected that argument, holding that competitors are not required to look for
alternative designs to avoid infringing product design trade dress. Otherwise, a party could
effectively have exclusive rights in utilitarian aspects of a product, the equivalent of a patent,
under trademark law. Rather, competitive necessity only comes into play in “esthetic
functionality” cases, where a feature that is normally esthetic (such as color) becomes functional
because consumers require products in that market to bear that color, for a reason other than the
reputation of the seller.
Coach, Inc. v. Goodfellow 54
Internet service providers can avoid liability for their customer’s copyright infringement
by instituting programs to respond to notices of infringement, terminate accounts of repeat
infringers, and address cases of known infringement. The copyright statute sets out a detailed
scheme, as discussed below. Goodfellow looked at the issue of secondary liability in trademark,
in the low-tech setting of a swap meet. Coach sent a number of letters putting Goodfellow, the
54
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swap meet operator, on notice of sales of counterfeit Coach goods. In the ensuing litigation,
Goodfellow argued that it should not be liable for the infringement by vendors. Goodfellow took
a number of remedial measures: “Goodfellow distributed pamphlets to vendors, posted copies of
a ‘counterfeit is prohibit’ sign, and called a meeting with vendors to address the selling of
counterfeit goods.” But the program was executed in perfunctory fashion: “However, the
pamphlets were distributed randomly and incompletely; the signs that were posted were actually
intended to address a growing problem with counterfeit currency, not counterfeit products;
attendance at the meeting with vendors, scheduled on a day when the flea market was not open
for business, was voluntary and attended only by some vendors; and communication was
frustrated by language differences.” Goodfellow uses common law theories of secondary
liability in trademark to create similar incentives to the statutory scheme of safe harbors in
copyright. Service providers may avoid liability for their customers’ actions only by putting into
effect bona fide programs to address notices of infringement and deal with known infringers.
Eastland Music Group, LLC v. Lionsgate Entm't, Inc. 55
As the Seventh Circuit noted, Eastland Music’s rap duo Phifty-50, “according to its web
site www.phifty-50.com, has to its credit one album (2003) and a T-shirt.” Eastland brought a
trademark infringement alleging that Lionsgate infringed the Phifty-50 mark by titling a movie
“50/50.” The court affirmed dismissal of the case. The decision is notable because the court ruled
as a matter of law that “50/50” for the title of a movie about someone with even chances of
surviving cancer could not cause confusion with “Phifty-50.” The case could be dismissed at the
outset, without the defendant incurring the costs of discovery, let alone a trial. As the court
stated, this makes it less likely in a clear case that the defendant will simply settle in order to
avoid the costs of depositions, interrogatories, market surveys, consultants and other costs of
trademark litigation.
The case is also notable for a leading federal judge nonchalantly relying on Wikipedia:
The phrase 50/50 or a sound-alike variant (50-50, fifty-fifty, fifty/fifty) has been in use as
the title of intellectual property for a long time. Wikipedia lists eight films with that title,
opening in 1916, 1925, 1972, 1981, 1982, 1992, 2004, and 2011. See
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 50/50. Six of these movies predate Eastland Music’s use.
The 1982 film is by and about a rock band. Wikipedia lists three TV shows with that title,
plus an episode of a fourth show. It also lists three songs whose titles contain the phrase
50/50. One of these is Frank Zappa’s 1973 song “50/50”. Then there’s “50/50 Luv”
released in 1995 by the rap group B.G. Knocc Out & Dresta.
A civil procedure purist might quibble with the court foreclosing discovery by the parties,
but relying on market information outside the record.
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Nguyen v. Biondo56
Nguyen shows that the policies with respect to encouraging challenges to invalid
intellectual property remain quite different in patent and trademark. Defendants purchased a hair
and nail salon and continued, contrary to the sales agreement, to use its trademark, “Tipsy.”
Sued for infringement, defendants sought to contend that the mark was invalid for “naked
licensing,” meaning that the mark had been licensed without control and so no longer served as a
trademark. But the court applied the doctrine of licensee estoppel, which prevents a licensee
from contesting the validity of the mark, on the theory that the licensee has agreed that the mark
is valid by licensing its use. In patent law, as discussed above, even a licensee’s explicit promise
not to contest validity does not prevent a challenge to validity.
Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey 57

56
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508 Fed. Appx. 932 (11th Cir. 2013).
717 F.3d 295 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2013).
20

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2366496

In contrast to Eastland, Kelly-Brown reversed the grant of a motion to dismiss, holding
that plaintiff had plausibly alleged that there was a likelihood of confusion between the use of
Own Your Power as a service mark for a motivational services business and the use of the same
phrase in the magazine of media magnate Oprah Winfrey. The Fourth Circuit rejected the
trademark-use approach espoused by the Sixth Circuit. Under that analysis, a court first
determines whether the defendant used the symbol as a mark before looking to whether that use
is likely to cause confusion. Applied to this case, a court could have held that the magazine used
the phrase, but not as a trademark, and so did not infringe (although the court’s analysis on other
issues indicated that it would find plausible allegation of trademark use in this case). That
analysis allows trademark cases to be decided without going through the multi-factor likelihood
of confusion analysis. It also allows something of a safe harbor, giving parties notice that they
can use well-known phrases without fear of trademark claims, where they do not use the phrases
as marks. This split between the circuits could ripen the issue for Supreme Court review.

Snap-on Inc. v. Scotese 58
A trademark owner seeking handover of an internet domain related to the trademark may
use litigation in federal court or arbitration under the UDRP. In both settings, the determinative
issue is likely to be whether the registrant acted in “bad faith.” Case law continues to give
content to that vague standard.
Snap-On Incorporated brought a UDRP proceeding, seeking turnover of the domain
snaponsock.com. Snap-On argued that the offer to sell Snap-On the domain for $195,000 was
evidence of a bad faith intent to profit. But the panel considered that Snap-On had initiated the
negotiations, but had declined to name a price. That tactic was construed by the panel to be an
attempt to bring out a high offer, to lay the foundation for a bad faith claim. The respondent
further had evidence that he was legitimately using the domain to sell sock authentically carrying
the Snap-On brand.

Airfx.com v. AirFX, LLC; 59 Paul v. Domain Capital Inc. 60
These cases are also cautionary tales for trademark enforcement. Airfx held that a party
that pursued Anti-Cybersquatting Act claims in bad faith would be liable for attorney’s fees.
Paul reflects the increasing willingness of WIPO panels to refuse requests for domain name
handovers. The Ron Paul election organization sought the domains ronpaul.com and ronpaul.org
58
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from a former campaign worker. The domain owner offered the hand over ronpaul.org and to sell
ronpaul.com. When the election campaign turned instead to a WIPO arbitration proceeding, the
panel did not find the necessary bad faith.

22

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2366496

Copyright

Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc 61
Kirtsaeng, like the International Trade Commission cases in patent law discussed above,
shows a rights holder seeking to cut off the flow of goods at the critical point of importation, as
the world shrinks. Supap Kirtsaeng, a citizen of Thailand, studied mathematics at Cornell
University. Noticing that textbooks in the U.S. were pricier than their overseas edition, he saw an
arbitrage opportunity. He had friends and family purchase the Asian editions in Thailand and
ship them to him, for resale at a profit. The first sale doctrine generally allows the owner of an
authorized copy to resell it. But first sale applies only to a copy “lawfully made under this
title.” 62 The Second Circuit had held that first sale did not apply to copies printed abroad,
because U.S. copyright law applies only within the U.S. A copy “made under this title,” on that
reading, must be made where U.S. copyright law (Title 17 of the United States Code) applies.
Kirtsaeng contended that “lawfully made under this title” meant simply that making the book
was not unlawful under U.S. copyright law. Wiley authorized its Asian editions, so first sale
would allow a buyer to resell an authorized copy.
The Court looked to the provision’s interplay with various other parts of the Copyright
Act, such as provisions that make importation an infringement of the distribution right and
provisions that protect the copyrights of foreign authors. The issue requires unraveling the
copyright owner's right of public distribution, its lesser included rights of importation, and the
first sale doctrine's limitation on the distribution right. There are policy arguments for enforcing
geographic limits. A publisher could rely on the rule to make less expensive editions available in
developing countries, without imperiling its domestic market price. But perhaps the
determinative factor in resolving how to read the murky language was that “reliance upon the
‘first sale’ doctrine is deeply embedded in the practices of those, such as booksellers, libraries,
museums, and retailers.” 63 If first sale had a geographic limit, then a book printed in France
could not be sold at a book store or loaned by a library. A museum could not exhibit an African
sculpture. A gallery could not sell a painting purchased abroad.

61
62
63

133 S. Ct. 1351 (U.S. 2013).
17 U.S.C. § 109.
133 S. Ct. at 1366.
23

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2366496

Harney v. Sony Pictures TV, Inc. 64

Photographer Harney took a photo of socialite Clark Rockefeller and his daughter
leaving a Boston church. Not too long after, Rockefeller was exposed as an impostor, Christian
Karl Gerhartsreiter. The photo was published widely, including an FBI "Wanted" poster, as the
police hunted Gerhartsreiter. A made-for-TV movie recounted the tale, using its own version of
the photo without permission from Harney.
Copyright protects only original creative expression. The court recognized the creativity
in composing the picture, but held that Sony copied only unprotected facts: “Harney's creation
consists primarily of subject matter – ‘facts’ -- that he had no role in creating, including the
central element of the Photo: the daughter riding piggyback on her father's shoulders.” 65 The
image became famous, but “we do not see how subsequent events can fortuitously transform
unoriginal elements of a visual work into protectible subject matter.” 66
In a world where video and pictures increasingly capture everything (from security
cameras to Google Glass), Harney may affect how those that initially capture an image control
its future.

64
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FireSabre Consulting LLC v. Sheehy 67

Copyright subsists in a creative work when the work is “fixed in any tangible medium of
expression.” 68 Firesabre, a consultant, assisted a school in building an educational project in the
virtual world Second Life. Firesabre terraformed (used development tools to alter the
topography and landscape) of several islands, which students subsequently modified. As in many
copyright cases, the relationship foundered and the parties disputed ownership of the work. The
school contended that the terraforming work was not “fixed,” and so not subject to copyright.
Rather than fixed for the ages, the work was subject to change. But “fixed” under the Copyright
Act requires only that the work be "sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration." 69 Now
that many creative acts may be saved in digital form in games and in the course of everyday life,
the holding has potential broad scope.

67
68
69

2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139550 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2013).
17 U.S.C. 102(a).
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139550 at 16-17, quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101.
25

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2366496

Cariou v. Prince 70

Cariou published photos take over six years in Jamaica in his book, Yes Rasta. Prince, a
successful appropriation artist, tore photos from copies of the book and altered them with paint,
printing, and pasted elements. Galleries exhibited Prince’s adaptations and sold them, some for
upwards of two million dollars. The Second Circuit held that Prince’s adaptations did not
infringe Cariou’s copyrights, rather were protected as fair use. The court placed great weight on
its determination that the use was “transformative,” a strong factor in favor of fair use. The
Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell made the transformative nature of a work important, in
holding fair use protected a rap parody version of the song Pretty Woman. Cariou reads
Campbell broadly. In particular, Cariou rejected the trial court’s reasoning that a transformative
use must be one that, like the parody in Campbell, comments on or criticizes the first work, or
provides similar functions like providing historical context. Prince testified that he did not really
have any message, let alone commentary or criticism of the photographs. But Cariou looked to
Campbell‘s broad language that a work may be transformative if it alters “the original with “new
expression, meaning, or message.” 71 In the court’s view, Prince’s work did: “These twenty-five
of Prince’s artworks manifest an entirely different aesthetic from Cariou’s photographs. Where
Cariou’s serene and deliberately composed portraits and landscape photographs depict the
natural beauty of Rastafarians and their surrounding environs, Prince’s crude and jarring works,
on the other hand, are hectic and provocative.” The court also saw little harm to the market for
Cariou’s work, because the artists served such different audiences.
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Sofa Entm't, Inc. v. Dodger Prods. 72 Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc. 73
Sofa Entertainment and Green Day both involved minor uses of copyrighted works. The
former held fair use applied to including a seven-second clip, in which Ed Sullivan introduced
the Four Seasons singing group on his television show, in Jersey Boys, a musical about the
group. The latter held that fair use applied to the use of a copyrighted street art illustration in a
back-drop video used during concerts of the band Green Day. Both cases saw the use as
transformative. The Ed Sullivan clip served as “evidence of the band's enduring prominence in
American music.” 74 The illustration was “only a component of what is essentially a street-art
focused music video about religion and especially about Christianity.” 75
Both cases take a conflicting case to the leading case on music sampling, Bridgeport
Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc. 76, which rejected fair use applied to sampling, the use of
even small amounts of musical recordings.
AP v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 77; Am. Inst. of Physics v. Schwegman Lundberg &
Woessner, P.A. 78; Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc. 79
Meltwater held that fair use did not protect a news clipping service that located news
stories of particular interest to its subscribers and provided clips to its customers.
Meltwater's "Global Media Monitoring” service enables "users to monitor the news based on the
presence of certain words or phrases in news articles appearing on the Internet and to receive
excerpts of those news articles. Meltwater uses automated computer programs or algorithms to
copy or "scrape" an article from an online news source, index the article, and deliver verbatim
excerpts of the article to its customers in response to search queries.” 80 Once again, the effect on
actual and potential markets weighed heavily: “By refusing to pay a licensing fee to AP,
Meltwater not only deprives AP of a licensing fee in an established market for AP's work, but
also cheapens the value of AP's work by competing with companies that pay a licensing fee to
use AP content in the way that Meltwater does.” 81 That distinguished the cases that had applied
fair use to search engines. Rather than thumbnail versions of photographs or snippets of text,
Meltwater provided the very information sought and so replaced the original works.
A clipping practice of another sort was fair use. Am. Inst. of Physics held fair use
allowed law firms to make and keep electronic copies of scientific and engineering articles
related to patent applications. The law firm was required to submit copies to the United States
Patent Office, a use the plaintiffs dropped claims of infringement for. The court saw little market
harm, because patent lawyers were not in the typical market, “academics, physical scientists and
72
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researchers, engineers, educators, students, and members of the general public who want to read
peer-reviewed scholarly, highly specialized articles about the physical sciences and other
scientific disciplines.” 82
Redigi rejected fair use as a means to translate first sale rights to the digital world. First
sale authorizes the sale or distribution of an authorized copy. Someone owning authorized copies
of music on a CD or flash drive could sell it. Redigi’s service offered the functional equivalent.
Customers could sell music online by agreeing destroy their own copies after a copy was
delivered to the purchaser. But that process involved making copies and distributing them, for
the purpose of sale. Nor did the court read first sale to apply to the practice. The court, noting
that the statute applies first sale only to a “particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under
this title,” declined to extend the rights on policy grounds. Rather, it noted that the online world
is different: “the first sale doctrine was enacted in a world where the ease and speed of data
transfer could not have been imagined.” 83
Redigi and Meltwater can both be seen as first sale cases. Meltwater could have bought
paper copies of newspapers and cut out articles for clients. Redigi could operate a used CD store.
Making electronic copies and distributing them is similar, but not close enough for courts.
Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc. 84
Working with several research libraries, Google has scanned over twenty million books.
As the court noted, the project provides several services. Google Books allows users to find
books for purposes from research to inter-library lending to curiosity, and to find excerpts within
books. Searches receive a snippet of relevant books, along with information about the book,
often including where the book may be purchased. Google Books also “greatly promotes a type
of research referred to as ‘data mining’ or ‘text mining.’ Google Books permits humanities
scholars to analyze massive amounts of data -- the literary record created by a collection of tens
of millions of books. Researchers can examine word frequencies, syntactic patterns, and thematic
markers to consider how literary style has changed over time.” 85 Google has saved copies of out
of print books that might otherwise have been lost over time. Digital copies can be adapted easily
for readers with visual or other disabilities. Google Books also leads to sales of books.
In 2013, after some nine years of litigation and attempts at settlement, the trial court
granted Google summary judgment, on the grounds of fair use. The court found the use “highly
transformative. Google Books digitizes books and transforms expressive text into a
comprehensive word index that helps readers, scholars, researchers, and others find books. . . .
Google Books is also transformative in the sense that it has transformed book text into data for
purposes of substantive research, including data mining and text mining in new areas, thereby
82
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opening up new fields of research.” 86 The court also found no market harm to authors, rejecting
the theory that prospective readers might, rather than buy a book, use Google Books to read it
one snippet at a time. In terms of fair use doctrine, the case is notable for extending the meaning
of “transformative,” to include uses that exploit non-copyrighted aspects of works, a category of
use deemed fair, under other terminology, in cases involving data bases or reverse engineering
of software.

Enter. Mgmt. Ltd. v. Warrick 87

Copyright protects original, creative expression, not ideas or nonoriginal elements.
Warrick argued he could copy diagrams created by Lippit, because they simply embodied
Lippit’s ideas about organizational management. But although “Lippitt's diagram may express
an idea, Warrick could express the same ideas in his own fashion. He might have organized the
components in a pie-chart-style format to show how each is a component of a larger whole. He
could have approached the concept in a two-column format, listing each defect in the left column
and the missing component in the right column.” 88 Warrick also argued the diagrams lacked the
necessary creativity for copyright protection, consisting simply of typical diagram elements:
86
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“Warrick says the elements of Lippitt's diagram—short labels, shapes, symbols, and selection of
typeface—are not eligible for copyright protection.” 89 But any “copyrightable work can be
sliced into elements unworthy of copyright protection. Books could be reduced to a collection of
non-copyrightable words. Music could be distilled into a series of non-copyrightable rhythmic
tones. A painting could be viewed as a composition of unprotectable colors.” 90

Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc. 91; Righthaven L.L.C. v. Hoehn 92
Copyright law does not allow debt collectors. If someone is owed a debt for an unpaid
loan or a breached contract, they can sell that debt to someone else, who can sue to collect. But
copyright limits standing; only the owner of a copyright or some of its exclusive rights may sue
for infringement. 3Taps and Righthaven both turned on the issue, whether a license conveyed
sufficient rights for the licensee to bring a copyright infringement action. In both cases, the court
held that the agreements did not transfer such exclusive rights.
Righthaven held that an agreement transferring rights to sue for copyright infringement
will not convey sufficient rights to support standing in a copyright infringement action. 93 The
right to sue is itself not one of the exclusive rights. Accordingly, Righthaven’s business model,
which depended on simply obtaining the rights to sue from various copyright holders and then
searching for likely licensees, was not viable. Much possible infringement occurs in this digital
age. Copyright holders will not be able to monetize it by transferring simply the right to sue,
which would allow them to distance themselves from enforcement.
Craigslist requires a different sort of choice. The terms of use for Craigslist provided that
Craigslist “does not claim ownership of content that its users post.” The court rejected the rather
hopeful argument that such terms did not convey ownership but did convey an exclusive license
by negative implication, because previous terms of use had explicitly disclaimed an exclusive
license. More definitive terms will be required to support the transfer of exclusive rights. 94
Craigslist puts some web site owners in a tricky position. If they wish to sue for infringement of
material on the site, they must have their users agree to transfer exclusive rights, something users
may not wish to give up.
Gary Friedrich Enters., LLC v. Marvel Characters, Inc.; 95 Metro. Reg'l Info. Sys. v. Am.
Home Realty Network, Inc. 96; Agence France-Presse v. Morel 97
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717 F.3d at 1118.
717 F.3d at 1119 (citation omitted).
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61837 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2013).
716 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2013).
Righthaven LLC v. Hoehn, 716 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2013)
Id.
716 F.3d 302 (2d Cir. 2013).
722 F.3d 591 (4th Cir. 2013).
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5636 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2013).
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Much of intellectual property law is contract law. Marvel Characters shows that drafting
a contract as broadly as possible is not always enough. The agreement expansively described the
rights transferred: “forever all rights of any kind and nature in and to the Work.” But the
agreement was not interpreted to necessarily convey the renewal term in the subject work, the
Ghost Rider comics, because it did not specifically mention those rights (along with other
ambiguities in the contract). 98
Metro Regional addressed copyright’s statute of frauds. To effectively transfer a
copyright or slice thereof, there must be a signed writing. That writing requirement can be met,
the court held, under Section 204 of the Copyright Act. Electronic Signatures in Global and
National Commerce Act, by a party clicking Yes to a terms of use agreement. Parties concerned
about keeping copyright should, before uploading, read the terms of use (not fun).
Twitter’s terms of use did not give benefits to third parties. Twitter’s terms of use allow
use of photos by Twitter. That permission does not extend to the world (basic contract law on
third party beneficiaries) and so did not permit various parties to publish photos taken from
Twitter.
Secondary Liability cases
AT&T was not secondarily liable for copyright infringement in mobile messaging, such
as unauthorized forwarding of multimedia messages. The telecommunications had limited ability
to control and supervise the content of messages, and no direct financial interest in the activity. 99
By contrast, a web site that suggested that the use of BitTorrent to its users to share movies and
provided specific technical support to share and to circumvent controls was liable for inducement
of copyright infringement. 100
Under the safe harbor provisions of section 512 of the Copyright Act, Internet service
providers can avoid liability for material stored by users, provided they remove infringing
content they have reason to know of, including responding to take-down notices. 101 Video
sharing service Veoh qualified for protection, where there was no showing Veoh failed to act
upon knowledge of specific infringements. Veoh also implemented hashing software to identify
infringers and terminated the accounts of repeat infringers. 102 Likewise, an ISP that gathered
analytical data, such as search engines traffic and keyword ads, did not have such necessary
98

716 F.3d 302 (2d Cir. 2013).
Luvdarts, LLC v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 710 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2013).
100
Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Gary Fung, 710 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2013). See also David v. CBS Interactive
Inc., No. 2:11-cv-09437-DSF-JC (C.D. Cal., Feb. 19, 2013)(holding that an article analyzing technical details of
file-sharing was not inducement of copyright infringement).
101
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
102
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013). See also Capitol Records
Inc. v. MP3tunes LLC., 07 Civ. 9931 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2013) (holding factual determination of actual knowledge
or willful blindness required to adjudicate applicability of safe harbor).
99
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awareness of infringement to destroy immunity. 103 But an ISP would have to respond to takedown notices received, even if they did not come in the manner most efficient for the ISP’s
operations. 104
The senders of take-down notices also have the duty to send them in good faith. Sending
a notice for works already known to be removed could rise to liability for misrepresentation. 105
But one court held that investigating whether the posting was protected by fair use was not
required. 106 A midwife had posted a photo of herself making an obscene gesture, with a caption
directed at a physician opponent. When the physician posted the photo on another blog, the
midwife sent a take-down notice. Although the physician’s posting was likely fair use, sending
the take-down notice was held in good faith.
******
Other notable copyright cases: The Second Circuit upheld the view that using individual
devices to capture, copy, and retransmit broadcast programming to subscribers, was not an
infringing public performance. WNET v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013). The Ninth
Circuit held that criminal copyright liability requires that the defendant knew of the illegal nature
of the activity. United States v. Liu, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 20011 (9th Cir. 2013). Certain
famous comic books were held by the Second Circuit to be works made for hire, and so not
subject to termination of transfers. Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 119 (2d Cir.
2013). A court applied the hypothetical transaction test to find a reasonable royalty measure of
damages in a copyright case, something done rarely in copyright but commonly in patent cases.
Gaylord v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 539 (Fed. Cl. 2013)(holding that USPS would be liable
for $684,844.94 for using an image of the Korean War Memorial without the authorization of its
sculptor).
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Obodai v. Cracked Entm't, Inc., 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 10734 (2d Cir. May 29, 2013)
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Yandex N.V., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65802 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 2013)
Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, N.D. Ill., No. 1:10-cv-06517, 9/3/13).
Tuteur v. Crosley-Corcoran, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128924 (D. Mass. Sept. 10, 2013).
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Trade secret

Scienton Techs., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l Inc. 107
A product idea can be a trade secret. But it is no longer a trade secret if the idea is
necessarily disclosed when the product is sold. 108 The concept of combining several existing
computer programs could be valuable information. Once the programs were bundled and sold,
the information would be readily available to others and not subject to trade secret protection.
But there could be other causes of action, such as misappropriation of an idea, breach of contract,
or unfair competition.
United States v. Howley 109
Howley illustrates how criminal liability under the federal Economic Espionage Act can
ratchet up the stakes and means of enforcement in intellectual property cases. Wyko had a big
contract to build big tires, but had difficulty in preparing the necessary machines. Wyko sought
access to similar machines at a Goodyear facility. When Goodyear needed repairs that Wyko
provided, Wyko sent not technicians, but key engineers on the tire project. They surreptitiously
took photos and emailed them to their Wyko accounts. Wyko’s IT manager happened upon the
photos while archiving emails. Concerned about illicit activity, the IT manager anonymously
emailed the photos to Goodyear. The FBI were alerted and the engineers arrested.
To violate the Economic Espionage Act, the defendant must take trade secret
information, information that is not readily available and is subject to reasonable security
measures. Although the machines were not under lock and key, Goodyear took reasonable
security measures: “Goodyear surrounded its Topeka factory with a fence and required visitors to
pass through a security checkpoint. Before Roberts and Howley entered the factory, they had to
obtain advance permission from Goodyear, sign confidentiality agreements and agree not to take
photographs during their visit.” The security measures, and Wyko’s scheming to get at the
information, was sufficient evidence that the information was not readily available through other
means.
Daniels Health Scis., LLC v. Vascular Health Scis., LLC 110
Information compiled, selected and filtered from public sources may be a trade secret. A
physician compiled and analyzed scientific research with respect to a dietary supplement. The
information was shown in a PowerPoint presentation to potential investors, but only if they
107
108
109
110

Scienton Techs., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63009 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2013)
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63009 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2013)
707 F.3d 575 (6th Cir. 2013).
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signed non-disclosure agreements. Although the individual items of research were publicly
available, the compilation constituted valuable information subject to reasonable security
measures.
CFAA cases
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act can be more effective than trade secret law in
protecting “proprietary” information. Someone who “accesses a computer without authorization
or exceeds authorized access” and obtains information may be liable under the CFAA. Courts
continue to split on when computer access is unauthorized. In particular, whether access is
unauthorized if someone with authority to access a computer breaches related rules, such as an
employment contract or terms of use. Widespread debate about the scope and penalties of the
CFAA was triggered by the suicide of Aaron Swartz, a noted software developer and open
culture advocate. Swartz was under indictment for allegedly violating the CFAA by downloading
academic articles en masse.
Defendants were held not to violate the CFAA when they, in the course of creating a
competitor to their employer, copied files containing technical data, customer lists and business
information. 111 “This Court declines the opportunity to expand the CFAA to include situations
where an employee takes confidential information, using authorization given to him and
controlled by his employer.” 112 Employees who emailed their employer’s business plans and
customer data before leaving to work for a competitor did not make unauthorized use. 113
Creating a false Facebook page, using other’s identities, would violate the Facebook terms of
service but did not violate the CFAA. 114 Forwarding an email from a listserv, even if contrary to
the governing rules, did not violate the CFAA. 115
Other courts found CFAA violations in fact patterns turning on breach of contract.
Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc. 116 held an individual’s authority to access the Craigslist site was
terminated, where Craigslist sent him a cease and desist letter for violating terms of use and
blocked access from IP numbers associated with him. So one person may violate the CFAA by
accessing a web site that is generally open to the public. A potential CFAA violation occurred
where an insurance agent “accessed Farmers' computer system to download information
regarding Farmers' policyholders, including his entire customer list, for the purpose of using this
information after termination of his Agency Appointment Agreement. Downloading this
information was in violation of Defendant McCarren's Agency Appointment Agreement.” 117
111
112
113
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115
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Advanced Aerofoil Techs., AG v. Todaro, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25711 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2013).
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25711 at 21.
Power Equip. Maint., Inc. v. Airco Power Servs., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91484 (S.D. Ga. June 28, 2013).
Matot v. CH, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138327 (D. Or. Sept. 26, 2013).
Stern v. Weinstein, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 5486 (9th Cir. Mar. 20, 2013).
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116732 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2013).
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Steele Ins. Agency, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104606 (E.D. Cal. July 23, 2013).
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Likewise, where parties gave members of their family their passwords and allowed them to
access Farmers’ system, that was deemed unauthorized access. 118

Airwatch LLC v. Mobile Iron, Inc. 119
Where a company licenses software to customers, there is normally no trade secret in the output
the customers create using the software, such as the visible information and graphics that appear
on the screen. But if the customers agree to keep the information confidential and the company
takes sufficient measures to limit access to the software, such information may remain a trade
secret, as in Airwatch. The case also illustrates courts’ dislike of deceptive actions to get
information. The defendants used false names, addresses and other information to signed up as
potential customers of a competitor. Such a defendant is less likely to get the benefit of what
was, as the court noted, a close question on whether the information disclosed was a trade secret.

Lamont v. Vaquillas Energy Lopeno, Ltd. 120

Most trade secret cases involve information like customer lists or computer program
source code. At issue in Lamont was whether “treasure map” was a trade secret. The Lopeno
Prospect Treasure Map, drawn by a geologist rather than a buccaneer, showed the likely location
118
119
120

See id.
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125817 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 4, 2013).
2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 11734 (Tex. App. San Antonio Sept. 18, 2013).
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of large natural gas field. The map was used by former employees to lure investors in new
company and to use a well to mine the gas. The court held the map was a trade secret, even
though the first company had shown it to some potential investors without getting them to sign
nondisclosure agreements.
Aqua Connect v. Code Rebel, LLC 121
Aqua Connect also shows how contracts can protect trade secrets, even after software has
been delivered to potential customers. Code Rebel downloaded Aqua Connect’s Terminal
Server software. Code Rebel agreed to the EULA, which prohibited reverse engineering. The
EULA was for a 14-day trial period. Defendants argued that once the EULA terminated, they
were no longer bound by the agreement not to reverse engineer the computer software end-userlicense-agreement with prohibition on reverse engineering continued.

Core Labs. LP v. Spectrum Tracer Servs., L.L.C. 122
Where defendant used plaintiff’s trade secret fracking software, there was irreparable
harm and an injunction would apply. Core Labs simply reflects the continuing strong protection
given trade secrets, where wrongful behavior obtains.

Wellogix, Inc. v. Accenture, L.L.P. 123
A patented invention cannot be a trade secret, because the patent discloses the technology
to the world. In Accenture, defendant used misappropriated software source code to build a
competing product. Defendants argued that there was no trade secret, because plaintiff had
patents on the subject matter. But the patents were not introduced as evidence. Plaintiff met its
burden by showed valuable information subject to reasonable security measure. The burden then
shifted to defendants to show that the information had been patented. Plaintiffs do not bear the
burden of proving a negative, rebutting every possible theory that defendants might have, even if
the theory has not been supported by evidence.
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2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103078 (C.D. Cal. July 23, 2013).
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16285 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 7, 2013).
716 F.3d 867 (5th Cir. Tex. 2013).
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Pending: the Supreme Court has taken the following cases for review:

CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty., No.13-298 (U.S. 2013) Issue: the standard for determining
whether computer-related inventions are within patentable subject matter
Medtronic Inc. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 12-1128 (U.S., 2013) Issue: correct standard for
burden of proof to support declaratory judgment of noninfringement or invalidity of patent
Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., No. 12-873 (U.S., 2013) Issue: which
parties have standing to bring a false advertising claim under the federal Lanham Act
Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc. (U.S.,2013) and Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon
Health & Fitness, Inc. (U.S., 2013) both involve when attorney’s fees are awarded to the
successful party in a patent case: the standard of review on appeal and how to determine a case is
“exceptional” for the purposes of 35 U.S.C. §285
Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. (U.S., 2013) issue: whether laches, for unreasonable
delay in bringing a copyright infringement case, may bar an action, where the statute of
limitations has not run
***************************
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